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Using a longitudinal household panel dataset in the United 
Kingdom, where most interviews are conducted in September 
each year, we are able to show that the attacks of September 
11 resulted in higher levels of mental distress for those 
interviewed after that date in 2001 compared to those 
interviewed before it. This provides one of the first examples 
of the impact of a terrorist attack in one country on well-
being in another country.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Terrorism and terror attacks have long been a major international problem, 
with potentially serious consequences for human welfare (Frey et al, 2007). 
The attacks of September 11 2001 were one of the most prominent acts of 
terrorism in recent times but just what are the consequences of such attacks? 
Economists use the underlying exogeneity of terrorist attacks as a way to 
establish the causal relationship from those attacks to various economic 
outcomes, such as tourism (Enders et al, 1992), national output (Abadie and 
Gardeazabal, 2002), net foreign direct investment (Abadie and Garzeazabal, 
2008) and urban expansion (Blomberg and Sheppard, 2007). However, 
terrorism only directly affects a small fraction of the capital stock (Becker and 
Murphy, 2001), and there are also studies that show that it does not affect all 
economic outcomes (e.g. Glaeser and Shapiro (2002) find that terrorism has 
not altered the urban form). The well-being consequences of terrorism have 
also been studied in terms of the birth weight of babies in areas with a higher 
concentration of land mines, where the causal mechanism is thought to be the 
effects on the stress of mothers during pregnancy (Camacho, 2008).  
 
The terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 have stimulated quite a bit of 
research in their own right. For example, there is now evidence to suggest that 
the attacks had a detrimental effect on the financial market (Chen and Siems, 
2004; Straetmans et al, 2008), New York’s fiscal position (Dolfman and 
Wasser, 2004; Chernick and Haughwout, 2006), urban agglomeration (Abadie 
and Dermisi, 2008) and the demand for air travel (Blunk et al, 2006; Blalock 
et al, 2007). ). There was also a significant increase in the number of fatal 
traffic accidents after 9/11 (Gigerenzer, 2004), which has been found for other 
terrorist attacks (Stecklov and Goldstein, 2004).  
 
In terms of the direct well-being effects of 9/11, it has been found that 
survivors from damaged buildings reported substantial physical and mental 
health problems three years after the event (Brackbill et al, 2006). Post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) has been shown to be associated with direct 
exposure to the 9/11 attacks and the prevalence of PTSD in the New York 
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City metropolitan area was substantially higher than elsewhere in the country 
(Galea et al, 2002; Schlenger et al, 2002). Eidelson et al (2003) find a 
significant increase in the amount of work – in terms of the number of clients 
– received by psychologists working closest to Ground Zero compared to 
those received by their colleagues working elsewhere in the country. 
  
The effects of 9/11 were felt elsewhere in the US. For example, PTSD was not 
limited to those who experienced the 9/11 attacks directly (Silver et al, 2002) 
although overall distress levels were within normal ranges (Schlenger et al, 
2002). In a small sample from Wisconsin, Krueger (2007) found that 9/11 
increased sadness temporarily and decreased enthusiasm for at least seven 
days after the attacks. Also, in a nationally representative sample of 
Americans, Lerner et al (2003) found a heightening level of fear and anger 
amongst the US population following 9/11.  
 
Despite these and a range of other studies, we are unaware of any attempt to 
quantify the effects of the attacks on the mental distress of those outside of the 
attacked country. This study looks at the effects of 9/11 on the mental distress 
of those living in the United Kingdom. This study has two main strengths. 
First, we use a large longitudinal dataset, consisting of approximately 10,000 
individuals, which provides us with strong statistical power to discern patterns 
whist controlling for individual heterogeneity and underlying trends. Second, 
9/11 acts as an exogenous shock to the sampled population, which provides us 
with a very powerful natural experiment. 
 
2. Data and methods 
 
The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) is a nationally representative of 
British households, which contains over 10,000 adult individuals, and is 
conducted between September and December of each year (started in 1991). 
Respondents are interviewed in successive waves and the sample has 
remained representative of the British population since the early 1990s. For 
the study to be thought of a quasi-experiment, the timing of terrorist attacks 
need to be exogenous and largely randomly assigned in terms of the BHPS 
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interviews. The 9/11 attacks were clearly exogenous to the survey and many 
respondents are interviewed in September each year but at a random time 
during that month. To avoid any seasonality biases in our inferences, we only 
include those interviewed in September 2001 (excluding September 11 itself). 
This yields a balanced panel that consists of 3,263 individuals and 16,315 
observations across 5 years (1999–2003 inclusive). Keeping the same 
individuals in the two groups over time allows a within-person analysis. 
 
The measure of mental distress is the twelve items from the negative affect 
scale of the General Health Questionnaire (Goldberg, 1978).
 
Respondents are 
asked how often (on a four point category scale) over the past few weeks they: 
(i) had lost sleep over worry; (ii) felt constantly under strain; (iii) felt they 
could not overcome difficulties; (iv) been feeling unhappy and depressed; (v) 
been losing confidence; (vi) been feeling like a worthless person; (vii) were 
playing a useful part in things; (viii) felt capable of making decisions; (ix) 
been able to enjoy day-to-day activities; (x) been able to concentrate; (xi) been 
able to face up to problems; and (xii) been feeling reasonably happy. The 
number of times a person places himself or herself in the top two categories 
was given a one, and then all twelve questions were added together to produce 
the so-called ‘caseness score’, in which higher numbers correspond to higher 
levels of mental distress. This composite rating is a good proxy for the 
transient component of negative affectivity (Watson and Clark, 1984) and has 
been used as a measure of mental well-being in recent studies by economists 
(Blanchflower and Oswald, 2007; Clark and Etile, 2002; Gardner and Oswald, 
2007; Jones and Wildman, 2008; Wildman, 2003) and to value intangible 
goods (e.g. Oswald and Powdthavee, 2008). 
 
Given the quasi-experiment nature of our study, we first examine the raw 
difference in GHQ means between the pre- and post-9/11 groups from 2000 
and 2001. We then include the covariates that affect GHQ and the underlying 
GHQ trend, so as to control for some spurious correlations between some 
omitted variables affecting the GHQ after 11
th
 September, and the underlying 
GHQ trend. The control covariates are consistent with the determinants of 
well-being (Dolan et al, 2008) and include household income, age squared, 
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gender, education, employment status, health status and regional dummies. 
We also control for the pre- and post-9/11 seasonal effects by including 
dummies for the month interviewed in the waves before and after 2001.  
 
3. Results  
 
Figure 1 shows that the average levels of mental distress for both pre and post-
9/11 groups follow a very similar trend in the years that precede 2001. The 
trend however diverges in the year 2001. That is, the average level of mental 
distress of those interviewed post-9/11 in 2001 remains high in 2001 when it 
should have fallen along the same path as the average level of mental distress 
of the pre-9/11 group. Since both groups have already been exposed to the 
event by the time the survey was conducted in 2002, it is not surprising to see 
that this difference disappears one year after the 9/11 attacks. 
 
Now consider only 2000 and 2001 using a basic difference-in-difference 
estimator. Any change in means between the two groups over the two years 
must come from 9/11. The results suggest a 0.384 increase in mental distress 
from the terrorist attacks. Of course, this does not control for the underlying 
GHQ trend over the five years or any other covariates and so Table 1 presents 
the random-effects regression. There is a significant increasing trend in mental 
distress for both groups in 2000, but then it decreases only for the pre-9/11 
group. We find that the difference-in-difference estimator, or average 
treatment effect, is 0.377 GHQ points.  
 
We find that using fixed effects instead of random effects, a seven-year 
instead of a five-year panel, and restricting the sample to only those who are 
interviewed pre- or post-9/11 in every year, all make little difference to these 
results. Given that we have more than two time periods in our analysis, there 
is the potential for serial correlation which understates the standard deviation 
of the estimated treatment effects, leading to an overestimation of the t-
statistic (Bertrand et al, 2004). We test for serial correlation in our errors and 
find that our model has a Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.85, so we introduce 
AR(1) errors into our regression, which increases the standard error by an 
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negligible amount and produces an identical average treatment effect. It could 
still be the case that individuals interviewed immediately after 9/11 are 
driving the results, and so we additionally divided the post-9/11 group into 
two groups: interviews that took place September 12-20 and 21-30. We can 
find no evidence of a difference between these two groups. These robustness 




This study has shown that the 9/11 attacks in the United States increased the 
mental distress of United Kingdom residents – by a GHQ score of 0.377. 
Comparing this magnitude with other life events within our data is difficult 
since many events, such as marriage or being unemployed, are endogenous. 
Notwithstanding this, the magnitude of the 9/11 effect is potentially worse 
than becoming divorced, and about one-third of the effect of being 
unemployed or widowed in the same sample using the same methods. These 
are significant and robust effects. 
 
More speculatively, we can extrapolate beyond these data and consider how 
many people in the UK may have been affected by 9/11. A GHQ score of 
around 10 is a conservative threshold level at which higher levels of mental 
distress can be diagnosed as clinical depression (Goldberg et al, 1998), and so 
we can see how many people in the United Kingdom may have suffered the 
equivalent of clinical depression as a result of the 9/11 attacks. From the 
BHPS sample in 2001, there were 253 people between a GHQ value of 10 and 
10.99. A 0.377 change in mental distress at this part of the distribution 
represents 95 people. That is, 95 individuals, or 0.5% of the BHPS sample, 
could have been diagnosed with clinical depression as a result of 9/11. 
Aggregating this up to the 45.5 million adults in the UK in 2001, 227,000 UK 
residents may have experienced clinical depression as a result of 9/11. Our 
data suggest that a disproportionately high number of these would have been 
younger, poorer, female and single. This analysis therefore lends itself to a 
valuation of the September 11 attacks through treatment expenses, and 
provides a different way of valuing intangibles from other subjective well-
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being studies that use an income compensation (e.g. van Praag and Baarsma, 
2005; Dolan and Metcalfe, 2008; Oswald and Powdthavee, 2008).  
 
Whatever the precise scale the impact of 9/11 across the UK population, it is 
possible that individuals in the UK were affected by 9/11 because they 
believed that such events were more likely to happen in the UK in the near 
future, thereby increasing their fear and uncertainty. Given Krueger and 
Laitin’s (2008) finding that terrorists are more likely to attack wealthy 
countries, it seems natural for individuals in other wealthy countries to be 
affected by terrorist attacks overseas. Indeed, the results from our study 
support the Caplin and Leahy (2001) model where the events that caused the 
initial fear and uncertainty took place in another country.  
 
We can only speculate about such issues here as there has certainly been little 
discussion of the international spillover effects of security or terrorism. The 
US Congress Joint Economic Committee (2002) has suggested that some of 
the largest costs of terrorism were the difficult to measure costs of added 
anxiety, stress, and mental disorders associated with the increased threat of 
terrorism. These costs may also have been quite significant outside of the US 
too. We hope that this paper has provided further impetus to the analysis of 
the impact of terrorism.  
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Figure 1: Changes in mental distress due to 9/11 
 
Note: This is a balanced panel, with 727 individuals completed the survey between 1
st
 of 
September 2001 and 10
th
 of September 2001, and 2,536 individuals completed the survey 
between September 12
th
 2001 and September 30
th
 2001. The same individuals are tracked 
over the 5-year period from 1999 to 2003.  
 
Table 1: Random effects regression of 9/11 on mental distress (GHQ) 
Dependent variable: Mental distress Coefficient 
Treatment group -0.142  [0.127] 
T = 2000 0.255  [0.117]** 
T = 2001 -0.087  [0.118] 
T = 2002 0.102  [0.118] 
T = 2003 0.220 [0.118]* 
T = 2000 x Treatment group -0.023  [0.132] 
T = 2001 x Treatment group 0.377  [0.133]*** 
T = 2002 x Treatment group 0.102  [0.134] 
T = 2003 x Treatment group -0.025  [0.133] 
  
Constant 2.912  [0.545]*** 
  
Regional dummies (20) Yes 
Month interviewed dummies (9) Yes 
Background variables (20) Yes 
Observations 16,214 
Number of individuals 3,263 
Overall R-squared 0.05 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***<1%; **<5%; *<10% significance levels. 
Background variables include age
2
/100, log of household income, employment status (9), 
education (6), and marital status (5).  
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Appendix 
 
Changes in mental distress due to 9/11 – seven year balanced panel 
 
 
Note: This is a balanced panel, with 655 individuals completed the survey between 1
st
 of 
September 2001 and 10
th
 of September 2001, and 2,285 individuals completed the survey 
between September 12
th
 2001 and September 30
th
 2001. The same individuals are tracked 















  13 
Robustness regressions of 9/11 on mental distress (GHQ) – 5-year panel 
Dependent variable: Mental 
distress Fixed effects AR(1) errors RE 
Treatment group - -0.143 [0.126] 
T = 2000 0.252 [0.123]** 0.255 [0.115]** 
T = 2001 -0.078 [0.140] -0.089 [0.120] 
T = 2002 0.113 [0.165] 0.102 [0.120] 
T = 2003 0.237 [0.195] 0.220 [0.120]  
T = 2000 x Treatment group -0.014 [0.133] -0.022 [0.130] 
T = 2001 x Treatment group 0.384 [0.133]*** 0.377 [0.135]*** 
T = 2002 x Treatment group 0.117 [0.135] 0.103 [0.136] 
T = 2003 x Treatment group -0.023 [0.134] -0.025 [0.136] 
Constant 2.905 [1.172]** 2.868 [0.549]*** 
   
Regional dummies (20) Yes Yes 
Month interviewed dummies (9) Yes Yes 
Background variables (20) Yes Yes 
Observations 16,214 16,214 
Number of individuals 3,263 3,263 
Overall R-squared 0.02 0.05 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***<1%; **<5%; *<10% significance levels. 
Background variables include age
2
/100, log of household income, employment status (9), 
education (6), and marital status (5). !
 
Restrict the sample to only those who are interviewed 
pre- or post-9/11 in every year – so we have the possibility of different people in different 
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Robustness regressions of 9/11 on mental distress (GHQ) – 7-year panel 
 
Dependent variable: Mental 
distress 
Seven year panel 
(RE) 
Treatment group -0.177 [0.132] 
T = 1999 -0.116 [0.125] 
T = 2000 0.089 [0.125] 
T = 2001 -0.201 [0.125] 
T = 2002 -0.073 [0.126] 
T = 2003 0.002 [0.126] 
T = 2004 0.035 [0.126] 
T = 1999 x Treatment group 0.038 [0.142] 
T = 2000 x Treatment group 0.045 [0.142] 
T = 2001 x Treatment group 0.361 [0.141]*** 
T = 2002 x Treatment group 0.183 [0.142] 
T = 2003 x Treatment group 0.053 [0.142] 
T = 2004 x Treatment group 0.054 [0.142] 
Constant 3.323 [0.490]*** 
  
Regional dummies (20) Yes 
Month interviewed dummies (9) Yes 
Background variables (20) Yes 
Observations 20,487 
Number of individuals 2,940 
Overall R-squared 0.05 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***<1%; **<5%; *<10% significance levels. 
Background variables include age
2
/100, log of household income, employment status (9), 
education (6), and marital status (5). 
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Robustness regressions of 9/11 on mental distress (GHQ) – Two treatment 
groups 
 
Dependent variable: Mental distress Random effects 




 September -0.177 [0.136] 




 September -0.092 [0.143] 
T = 2000 0.254 [.117]** 
T = 2001 -0.087 [0.117] 
T = 2002 0.102 [0.118] 
T = 2003 0.219 [0.118]* 
T = 2000 x Treatment group A -0.033 [0.144] 
T = 2001 x Treatment group A 0.289 [0.144]** 
T = 2002 x Treatment group A 0.124 [0.145] 
T = 2003 x Treatment group A 0.113 [0.144] 
T = 2000 x Treatment group B -0.010 [0.150] 
T = 2001 x Treatment group B 0.484 [0.150]*** 
T = 2002 x Treatment group B 0.074 [0.151] 
T = 2003 x Treatment group B -0.195 [0.150] 
Constant 2.942 [0.544]*** 
  
Regional dummies (20) Yes 
Month interviewed dummies (9) Yes 
Background variables (20) Yes 
Observations 16,214 
Number of individuals 3,263 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***<1%; **<5%; *<10% significance levels. 
Background variables include age
2
/100, log of household income, employment status (9), 
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Robustness regressions of 9/11 on mental distress (GHQ) – Restricting to 
those who are interviewed pre- and post-9/11 of every year 
 
Dependent variable: Mental distress Fixed effects 
Treatment group 0.073 [0.108] 
T = 2000 -0.046 [0.139] 
T = 2001 -0.209 [0.152] 
T = 2002 0.052 [0.173] 
T = 2003 0.062 [0.203] 
T = 2000 x Treatment group 0.127 [0.154] 
T = 2001 x Treatment group 0.346 [0.151]** 
T = 2002 x Treatment group 0.019 [0.144] 
T = 2003 x Treatment group -0.173 [0.141] 
Constant 1.665 [1.243] 
  
Regional dummies (20) Yes 
Month interviewed dummies (9) Yes 
Background variables (20) Yes 
Observations 18,161 
Number of individuals 6,730 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***<1%; **<5%; *<10% significance levels. 
Background variables include age
2
/100, log of household income, employment status (9), 
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